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Abstract
Some labor markets have recently developed formal signaling mechanisms, e.g. the
signaling for interviews in the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We evaluate
the e¤ect of such mechanisms on two-sided matching markets by considering a game
of incomplete information between rms and workers. Workers have almost aligned
preferences over rms: each worker has typical commonly known preferences with
probability close to one and atypicalidiosyncratic preferences with the complemen-
tary probability close to zero. Firms have commonly known preferences over workers.
We show that the introduction of a signaling mechanism is harmful for this environ-
ment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate
information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. As a result, the introduc-
tion of a signaling mechanism lessens the expected number of matches when signals
are informative.
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1 Introduction
In December 2006, the Ad Hoc Committee of American Economic Association (AEA) im-
plemented signaling as an actual instrument to facilitate match formation in the job market
for new Ph.D. economists.1 This market begins in early Fall each year, when economics
departments advertise open faculty positions and graduate students nearing completion of
their dissertations apply for these positions according to their preferences. Each student has
an opportunity to send two signals to two departments prior to the market. Each signal
states only that the student has indicated her interest to a given department. The signals
are private, and only the faculty of the chosen department knows the students signal. Later,
departments invite students to interviews and daylong university visits that are followed by
job o¤ers to selected candidates. However, each department can interview only a small por-
tion of available students, which creates congestion in the market and introduces a strategic
dimension to the interviewing process. A typical department probably does not want to
spend time interviewing candidates who are being interviewed by the elite departments.
The Ad Hoc Committee introduced the signals in order to alleviate congestion at the
interviewing stage. Roth (2008) suggests that the limited number of signals can credibly
transmit information about studentspreference, which could help to reduce the coordination
failures faced by the market participants and facilitate better match formation (see also
Signaling for Interviews in the Economics Job MarketAEA (2005)2 for more discussion).
Coles et al. (2009) also obtain results that support this intuition. Contrary to these studies,
this paper shows that the signals can impede match formation in some environments.
We analyze one-to-one matching market between rms and workers without transfers.
Each agent knows its own preferences over agents on the other side of the market, but is
uncertain about the preferences of other agents. Workers have almost aligned preferences.
Each worker has either typicalcommonly known preferences with a probability close to one
or atypicalpreferences taken from some distribution with the complementary probability
close to zero. The preferences of workers are ex-ante independently distributed.3 Firms have
some xed and commonly known preferences over workers.
We concentrate on the analysis of a preference signaling mechanism by assuming that
each agent knows its preferences. Therefore, the interviewing stage is not necessary. We
1The Ad Hoc Committee was established in 2005 in order to develop ways to facilitate the job mar-
ket for new Ph.D. economists. Its members are Alvin E. Roth (chair), John Cawley, Philip Levine,
Muriel Niederle, and John Siegfried. The signaling mechanism is implemented via the AEA website:
http://www.aeaweb.org/joe/signal/.
2The document was created by the Ad Hoc Committee to provide advice to participants in the job market
for new Ph.D. economists; http://www.aeaweb.org/joe/signal/signaling.pdf.
3We assume that typical workers rank rms according to some public ranking. For example, typical
candidates in the job market for new Ph.D. economists rank departments of economics in their eld according
to the U.S. News and World Report ranking.
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consider a decentralized matching game with three stages. First, each worker chooses a rm,
to which she sends her signal. Each worker sends up to one signal; workers send signals
simultaneously. Only rms that receive signals observe them. Second, rms make decisions
about job o¤ers by taking into account signals received at the rst stage. Each rm can
make only one o¤er. Finally, each worker chooses an o¤er to accept among the available
o¤ers. Each worker can accept at most one o¤er.
We show that if rms respond to signals in this environment, i.e. treat signals informa-
tively, the introduction of signals decreases the expected number of matches. Prior to the
signaling, all rms have almost identical beliefs about worker preferences. However, after
the signals are received rms may have disparate beliefs. This disparity in beliefs leads to
coordination failure. As a result, the introduction of a signaling mechanism may decrease
the total number of matches and the welfare of agents.
Finally, we examine the implications from the introduction of a mechanism with public
signals, i.e. signals observed by all rms. Though the expected number of matches increases
compared to the game with private signals, public signals still impede match formation for
some environments. Public signals do not transmit enough information about worker prefer-
ences. This induces some rms to compete for the same workers, which creates mismatches
and decreases the expected total number of matches.
In addition to the market of new Ph.D. economists, some versions of the signaling mech-
anism studied in this paper emerged in other markets. Some online dating websites employ
signaling mechanisms, wherein agents send signals to potential partners to indicate special
interest. For example, each man of Cupid.com has several virtual rosesthey can attach
to their messages. Since there is almost no cost associated with an additional message to
a woman, these scarce roses provide men with a means of indicating their genuine interest
to particular women. Informal signaling is also an important part of the market for clinical
psychologists, described by Roth and Xing (1997). The ability of candidates to convey infor-
mation about the likelihood to accept an o¤er is crucial in this market. Program directors for
internships in clinical psychology have a tendency to hire applicants who explicitly express
their readiness to accept an o¤er immediately, even if these applicants are of a low quality.
Finally, early college admission in the U.S. can be viewed as a form of preference signaling.
Many schools require that applicants not send early applications to other schools and view
an early application as a signal of a students enthusiasm for a particular school.
Signaling that we analyze in this paper is a form of costless communication, or cheap talk.
There is no penalty attached for lying, and claims do not directly a¤ect payo¤s.4 Therefore,
signals can only enlarge the set of equilibria. In contrast to this paper, Crawford and Sobel
4Ration talk is a better name for signals in our setting. Though signals are costless, an agent can send
only a limited number of signals.
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(1982) show that a cheap talk lead to new equilibria that are Pareto-superior to the one
without communication.
Our negative results on expected number of matches in new cheap talk equilibria is in line
with Farrell and Gibbons (1989)s results, though it di¤ers in its intuition.5 Costless commu-
nication in their two-agent bargaining model gives the buyer an opportunity to pretend to
have a lower value and the seller an opportunity to pretend to have a higher value (compared
to the truthful information transmission in our model). This enhances their bargaining po-
sitions at the cost of the risk of no trade. New cheap talk equilibria are characterized by
both less trade and a reduction in the expected gains from trade.
In addition, signaling in our paper di¤ers fundamentally from the job market signaling
rst introduced in Spence (1973). First, signals in our model have no direct cost. In addition,
signals serve to convey information about worker preferences rather than worker quality.
Some recent works also analyze variants of signaling mechanisms. Coles et al. (2009) is a
paper that is most related to ours. They consider the same three stage model of decentralized
two-sided matching markets. However, they analyze markets with rm segments. Workers
agree on the ranking of rms across segments, but have idiosyncratic and uniformly distrib-
uted preferences within segments. For instance, all workers may agree as to which rms are
in the top vesegment and which are in the six to tensegment, etc., but may disagree
as to the exact ranking within a segment. Firm preferences over workers are idiosyncratic
and uniformly distributed. They show that, on average, introducing a signaling mechanism
increases both the expected number of matches as well as the expected welfare of workers
for this environment. The welfare of rms, on the other hand, changes ambiguously. Coles
et al. (2009) also examine the impact of a signaling mechanism for di¤erent environments
that vary in market size, the number of signals, positions, and periods of interaction.
Avery and Levin (2009) analyze match formation in the U.S. college admission market.
There are two types of early admission programs: early action programs, where students
may apply early but without any commitment to enroll, and early decision programs, where
students commit to enroll if accepted. Avery and Levin (2009) analyze early applications as
a signal of a students enthusiasm for a particular school. At the same time, schools benet
more from accepting more enthusiastic students. Their results suggest that selective (or elite)
schools benet from adopting early action policy. At the same time, a lower ranked school,
by adopting early decision policy, can attract some highly qualied but cautious students,
drawing them away from highly ranked schools.
Lee et al. (2009) run a eld experiment with the major Korean online dating website
Couple.net to measure potential gains from introducing virtual roses.6 They nd that
5We are thankful for Lones Smith who drew our attention to this comparison.
6This virtual rosesmechanism is similar to that of Cupid.com described above.
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users of both genders are more likely to accept a dating request when a virtual rose
is attached, and that roses are most helpful in improving acceptance rates for senders of
below average popularity.
Preference signaling can also be useful in centralized matching markets. Abdulkadiroglu
et al. (2008) show that the introduction of a signaling technology can improve the ex-ante
e¢ ciency of the deferred acceptance algorithm (see Gale and Shapley, 1962) in case of weak
preferences. Lee and Schwarz (2007) analyze preferences signaling in centralized matching
markets in a three step matching formation process: preference signaling, investments in
information acquisition, and the formation of matches based on available information. They
show that agents reveal their preference truthfully in an equilibrium under some assumptions
on agent utility.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple example that illustrates
why signals can facilitate coordination failure. Section 3 outlines our general model and
introduces some notations. Equilibrium analysis is presented in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes
the welfare of agents in the model with and without signals. Section 6 compares these welfare
implications with the results in the previous literature and discusses two controversial roles
of signals in matching markets. A public signaling mechanism is considered in Section 7.
Finally, Section 8 discusses some assumptions of our model and concludes.
2 A simple example
Let us consider a market with three rms and three workers. Each rm ranks the workers in
the same way (w1; w2; w3), i.e. each rm strictly prefers worker w1 to worker w2 to worker w3.
Each workers preference is either typical (f1; f2; f3) with probability 1 " or atypical with the
complementary probability "; where " is small. The atypical preferences are independently
uniformly distributed among all possible preference order lists. All workers are acceptable
to all rms and vice versa.
We rst examine behavior in the game in the absence of a signaling mechanism. The
only possible match in a sequential equilibrium of the game without signals is the assorta-
tive match, in which each rm is matched to the corresponding worker. Let now us analyze
the game with the signaling mechanism, described above. We consider the following equi-
librium strategies of agents.7 Each worker with typical preferences sends her signal to the
corresponding rm, i.e. worker wi sends her signal to rm fi. Each worker with atypical
preferences sends her signal to the best rm worse or equal to the corresponding one (ac-
cording to typical preferences). Each rm makes its o¤er to a worker better or equal to the
7See Theorem 1 for the proof that these strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium.
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corresponding one, only if it receives a signal from her. Each rm ignores all signals from
workers worse than the corresponding one. If a rm receives no signals, it makes an o¤er to
the best worker worse than the corresponding one.
Figure I.
Let us consider the realization of preference proles when only worker w1 is atypical and
rm f3 is her favorite rm. Worker w2 and worker w3 are typical. Figure I illustrates the
equilibrium behavior. Worker w1 sends her signal to rm f3. Worker w2 and worker w3 send
their signals to rm f2 and rm f3 correspondingly. Firm f3 makes an o¤er to worker w1, and
rm f1 anticipates that worker w1 is atypical and makes an o¤er to worker w2. Firm f2 also
makes its o¤er to worker w2 and eventually ends up unmatched because worker w2 accepts
rm f1s o¤er. The coordination failure arises because rm f2 has no information about
worker w1s type and cannot anticipate rm f1s behavior. Thus, the number of matches for
some realization of preferences is smaller than the number of matches when the signals are
not allowed. Therefore, the expected number of matches is also smaller.
3 Model
We consider a two-sided matching model with W workers and F rms, W  F . The set
of workers and the set of rms are denoted as W and F correspondingly. Both W and F
include the empty set. Each worker w orders rms according to some strict preference list
w. Similarly, each rm f orders workers according to some preference list f . W and F
together comprise the set of all possible workersand rmspreference lists.
Each agent a has cardinal utility compatible with her/its preference list a.8 If worker w
with preferences w is matched with rm f , she receives cardinal utility uw(f; w). Similarly,
if rm f with preferences f is matched with worker w, it receives cardinal utility uf (w; f ).
We assume that agent utility depends only on the rank of an agent with which it is matched.
8We employ cardinal utilities compatible with ordinal ranking similar to Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
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Specically, the utility of an agent from being matched with an agent on the kth position in
her/its preference list equals ua(k). We assume that agents have the same utility function;
i.e. for any agent a, ua(k) = u(k). Our results do not depend on the last assumption;
however, this assumption simplies the exposition.
Additionally, agents cardinal utility from being unmatched is normalized to zero. We
also assume that there is no worker whom rms do not want to hire, and there is no worker
who prefers being unemployed to being matched with some rm; i.e. for any k; u(k) > 0.
Each agent knows only her/its preferences and has some ex-ante common beliefs about
the other agentspreferences. We consider an environment where each rm f has some xed
publicly known preference list f . Each worker is one of two types: typicalor atypical. A
typicalworker w is denoted as w(T ). All workers of typical type have the same commonly
known preference list 0. An atypicalworker w is denoted as w(A). The preferences of
atypical workers are identically and independently distributed according to some distribution
A(W). Each worker is ex-ante typical with probability 1  " and atypical with probability
"; for some " 2 (0; 1). Our main analysis considers the case when " is small.9 We also assume
that the distribution of atypical preferences, A(W); has a full support, i.e. each rm can
be the top rm of an atypical worker with positive probability.10
To model the inuence of signals on congested markets, we consider a model with three
periods:
1. Agentspreferences are realized. Each worker sends a signal to at most one rm; signals
are sent simultaneously. Signals are observed only by rms who have received them.
2. Each rm makes an o¤er to at most one worker; o¤ers are made simultaneously.11
3. Each worker may accept at most one o¤er from the set of o¤ers she receives.
We restrict our analysis to pure strategies.12 A strategy of worker w is a duple sw =
(s1w; s
2
w) that represents her decisions at the rst and third stages. A strategy of a worker at
the rst stage is to choose a rm she sends her signal to, s1w : W ! F . A strategy of a worker
on the last stage is to choose an o¤er among those available to her, s2w : W2F ! F ; where
2F = fh : h  Fg. A strategy of rm f is its decision at the second stage. Firm f chooses the
worker to whom it makes an o¤er based on a set of signals it receives, sf : 2W !W, where
9The exact bound on " depends on the parameters of distribution A(W). However, for each distribution
A(W), one could nd an upper bound of ". We provide a more detailed discussion in Section 8.
10Formally, for any f 2 F and any w 2 W Pr(f = maxw(f 0 : f 0 2 F)) > 0.
11In practice, some rms should rationally make several o¤ers, anticipating that some workers probably
reject their o¤ers. We do not model these strategic decisions.
12The analysis of the o¤er game in which agents can use mixed strategies does not give additional intuition
to our main result that signals could impede match formation for some environments. However, this analysis
is available upon request.
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2W = fh : h  Wg: The dependence of rm strategy on preferences is omitted, because we
assume that each rm has some xed preferences.
For a given strategy prole of agents s = (sw; sf ) and realized agentstypes  2 (W)W 
(F)
F one can determine the nal matching and agentsutilities. We denote the utility of
agent a given a strategy prole s and a prole of types  as a(s; ): The interim expected
payo¤ of worker w with preferences w from strategy sw when the other agents follow a
strategy prole s w equals
uw(swjs w; w) =
X
 w
t( w)w((sw; s w); (w;  w));
where t( w) denotes the joint distribution of all agents except worker w preferences. The
interim expected payo¤ of rm f given a subset of received signals h  W, beliefs f (jh);
and other agentsstrategy prole s f is
uf (sf js f ; h) =
X

f (jh)f (sf ; s f ; ):
We employ the concept of sequential equilibrium for multi-stage games with observed
actions and incomplete information in order to solve the game (see Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991).
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Denition 1 A strategy prole (sw; sf ) and posterior beliefs f (jh) for each rm f and
each subset of workers h  W is a sequential equilibrium if
 for any w 2 W ; w 2 W : s1w(w) 2 arg max2F uw(js w; w);
 for any f 2 F ; h  W : sf (h) 2 arg max2W uf (js f ; h); and
 for any w 2 W ; w 2 W ; h0  F : s2w(h0; w) 2 arg max2h0 uw(; w);
where beliefs are dened using Bayesrule.13
Now we introduce some notations that will be useful in our further discussion. Though
worker strategy is a duple sw = (s1w; s
2
w), we will talk mainly about worker strategies at
the rst stage. The reason is that each worker has a strictly dominant strategy at the last
stage accept the best o¤er available since she knows her preferences and the preferences
are strict. To simplify notation, we omit the upper index and write sw(w) instead of s1w(w).
For convenience, we name rms according to the typical preference list 0 = (f1; :::; fF );
i.e. f1 is the best rm, f2 is the second best, etc. Similarly, we name workers in the following
way: worker w1 is the best worker among all workers W according to rm f1s preferences,
w1 = maxf1 (wjw 2 W); worker w2 is the best worker amongWnfw1g according to rm f2s
preferences, w2 = maxf2 (wjw 2 Wnfw1g); and so on. Generally, worker wi = maxfi (wjw 2
Wnfw1; :::; wi 1g) if i  F . The other workersWnfw1; :::; wFg are named according to some
prespecied order.14
We say a subset of workers h  W is reached for rm f when workers follow strategy
prole sW if ex-ante probability that only workers from set h send their signals to rm f
strictly more than zero.
Denition 2 A subset of workers h  W is reached for rm f when workers follow strategy
prole sW if
Pr(hf = h) =
X

t()
Y
w2h
Isw(w)=f
Y
w0 =2h
(1  Isw0 (w0 )=f ) > 0;
where Isw(w)=f =
(
1 if sw(w) = f
0 otherwise
and t() denotes the joint distribution of all agents
preferences.
We also say that rm f responds to worker ws signal, when workers follow strategy
prole sW ; if her signal changes the strategy of rm f with positive probability.
13O¤-equilibrium beliefs are dened by considering the limits of completely mixed strategies.
14For instance, if all rms have the same preferences , workers are named according to this preference
list  = fw1; :::; wW g.
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Denition 3 Firm f responds to worker ws signal, when workers follow strategy prole
sW , if there exists a subset of workers h; w =2 h, such that both h and h [ w are reached for
rm f , and sf (h) 6= sf (h [ w).
We proceed with equilibrium analysis in the next section.
4 Equilibrium analysis
As a benchmark, we rst consider an environment in which workers cannot send signals.
Then, the model outlined above is a static game of incomplete information. Therefore,
the notion of sequential equilibrium coincides with the notion of Bayesian equilibrium and
agentsbeliefs are irrelevant. There is a unique equilibrium match in this case.
If signals are not allowed and " is small, the only optimal strategy of rm f1 is to make
an o¤er to its best worker w1 = maxf1 (wjw 2 W). The second top rm anticipates that
worker w1 is likely to accept rm f1s o¤er. Hence, the only optimal strategy of rm f2 is to
make an o¤er to its best worker among Wnfw1g ; w2 = maxf2 (wjw 2 Wnfw1g) and so on.
Workers accept the best available o¤er. Overall, there is the maximum number of matches,
F (since F  W ), in the equilibrium when signals are not allowed.
Proposition 1 (No signaling equilibrium) For su¢ ciently small ", there is a unique
equilibrium when signals are not allowed: rm fj; j = 1; :::; F; makes an o¤er to worker wj;
worker wi; i = 1; :::; F; accepts the best available o¤er.
We further call the match in our benchmark model as no signalingmatch.
Now, we analyze the set of equilibria in the matching market with signals. Though signals
are voluntary in our model, they could still play a negative role and draw away rm o¤ers.
In order to eliminate such equilibria, we assume that if rm f makes an o¤er to worker w
when it does not receive her signal, rm f makes an o¤er to worker w when it receives her
signal.15
Assumption PRS (Positive Role of Signals). For any rm f 2 F and any worker w 2
W and any h  W ; w =2 h, if sf (h) = w then sf (h [ w) = w.
We further distinguish three types of equilibria in the matching model with signals.
15See Example A1 in Appendix for an example of an equilibrium in which Assumption PRS is violated.
10
Denition 4
 An equilibrium is babbling if no rm responds to any signal.
 An equilibrium is informative, if at least one rm responds to some workers signal.
 An equilibrium is very informative, if each rm responds to all signals from workers
better or equal to its no signaling match.
The set of the rst and second type equilibria, i.e. babbling and informative, exhaust the
set of all possible equilibria in our model. The set of equilibria of the last type is a subset of
the set of informative equilibria.
A babbling equilibrium always exists in our model because signals are costless. If rms
do not respond to signals, signals play no role in equilibria. Hence, the only possible match
in a babbling equilibrium is no signaling match.
Proposition 2 For su¢ ciently small "; the only possible match in a babbling equilibrium is
no signaling match.
If some rms respond to signals, then signals transmit information about workerspref-
erences in an equilibrium, which changes the overall matching outcome. However, there is
a great multiplicity of informative equilibria. One may suggest to use renements proposed
by (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and (Banks and Sobel, 1987).16 However, these criteria are very
powerful in the case of one sender and one receiver. The situation with many senders and
receivers is more di¢ cult. Though these criteria signicantly reduce the number of equilibria,
they do not guarantee uniqueness.
However, it is su¢ cient to restrict ourselves to the case in which each rm responds to all
signals from workers better or equal to its no signaling match, i.e. very informative equilib-
ria, in order to guarantee uniqueness. This equilibrium consists of the following strategies.
Worker wi sends her signal to the best rm among the rms that prefer worker wi to their
no signaling match (wi) = (fj 2 F : wi fj wj): If rm fj receives at least one signal from
the set of workers (fj) = (w 2 W : w fj wj); i.e. workers better or equal to worker wj, it
makes its o¤er to the best such worker; otherwise, it makes an o¤er to its best worker among
Wnfw1; :::; wjg:
16Cho and Kreps (1987) analyze never a weak responce, intuitive criterion, D1, and D2 renements. Banks
and Sobel (1987) analyze divinity and universal divinity renements.
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Theorem 1 For a su¢ ciently small "; under Assumption PRS the set of strategies,
 swi(wi) = maxwi (f 2 (wi));
 sfj(h) =
(
maxfj (w : w 2 h) if h \(fj) 6= ?
maxfj (w : w 2 Wnfw1; :::; wjg) if h \(fj) = ?
;
and the set of rms beliefs consistent with agents strategies constitute a unique very
informative equilibrium.17
The above theorem is remarkable because it shows that the equilibrium of the model is
unique, if we restrict our attention to the case in which rms use signals most extensively.
However, we should point out that we do not intend to eliminate all other equilibria. First,
the theorem illustrates typical agentsbehavior in an informative equilibrium. Workers do
not just send signals to the best rms. They send their signals to the best rms that respond
to these signals, which is in line with AEA advice to participants in the job market for new
Ph.D. economists (see AEA, 2005). Similarly, rms do not respond to all signals. Instead
they respond to the signals from workers better than those they could secure in the no
signaling equilibrium. Second, our results of welfare comparison do hold for most other
sequential equilibria.
5 Welfare properties of equilibria
We evaluate the e¤ect of signals on the matching market from an ex-ante perspective. We
mainly use the following quantitative characteristics: the expected number of matches, the
expected total welfare of rms, and the expected total welfare of workers.
Let us denote the ex-post number of matches for the prole of preferences  2 W F ,
when agents follow the prole of strategies s as m(s; ). Then, the expected number of
matches can be expressed as
E[M(s)] =
P
 t()m(s(); );
where t() denotes the joint distribution of all agentspreferences. Similarly, the expected
total welfare of workers and rms can be expressed as
E[Wrm(s)] =
P
f
P
 t()f (s(); ); and
E[Wworker(s)] =
P
w
P
 t()w(s(); )
17We should point out that there is a multiplicity of beliefs that could support this equilibrium on o¤-
equilibrium path.
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correspondingly.
Proposition 1 shows that the expected number of matches in any no signaling equilibrium
is the maximum one. Hence, it is impossible that the expected number of matches in any
informative equilibrium exceeds the expected number of matches in any no signalingequi-
librium. Example 1 and Example 2 demonstrate the case of strict inequality and equality
for this welfare criterion.
Example 1 is presented in the introduction and considers the very informative equilibrium
with three rms and three workers. To avoid a repetition, we do not discuss it here.
Example 1 (Fewer expected number of matches) There are three rms and three work-
ers .Firms have the same ranking over workers (w1; w2; w3). The typical worker preference
list is 0 = (f1; f2; f3). Atypical worker preferences are uniformly distributed. Firm fj;
j = 1; 2; 3; and worker wi, i = 1; 2; 3; equilibrium strategies are
 swi(wi) = maxwi (f 2 (wi));
 sfj(h) =
(
maxfj (w : w 2 h) if h \(fj) 6= ?
maxfj (w : w 2 Wnfw1; :::; wjg) if h \(fj) = ?
;
and the set of rmsbeliefs consistent with agentsstrategies.
Example 2 shows that some informative equilibria could have the maximum expected
number of matches. Intuitively, it is possible that if some rm fj secures a better match
with some atypical worker wi, rm fi always makes its o¤er to rm fjs no signaling match,
worker wj, in an equilibrium. Therefore, rms exchange their matches and it does not
decrease the number of matches.
Example 2 (Equal expected number of matches) Let us consider three rms and three
workers. All rms have the same preferences fj = fw1; w2; w3g: Let us consider the following
equilibrium strategies:
 sw1(w1) = maxw1 (f : f 2 ff1; f2g) and swi(wi) = fi, i = 2; 3;
 sfj(h) =
(
maxfj (w : w 2 h) if h \(fj) 6= ?
maxfj (w : w 2 Wnfw1; :::; wjg) otherwise
; for j = 1; 2;
 sf3(h) =
(
maxf3 (w : w 2 h) if h \(f3) 6= ?
w3 otherwise
:
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The set of equilibrium beliefs is such that if rm f1 or f2 receives a signal from worker
w1, it believes that it is worker w1s top rm. If rm f3 receives a signal from worker w1; its
belief coincides with her prior, i.e. worker w1 is typical with probability 1   " and atypical
with probability ". Similarly, if any rm fj receives a signal from worker w2 or w3, its belief
coincides with its prior. To put it briey, only rm f1 and rm f2 respond to worker w1s
signal. All other signals are ignored. One may check that the described strategies constitute
an informative equilibrium.
The results about the expected total welfare of rms and the expected total welfare of
workers are not so straightforward and depend on the relative magnitudes of u(k). The
intuition is that signals in an informative equilibrium play two roles. On the one hand,
signals help to secure bettermatches between some atypical workers and rms. On the
other hand, the introduction of signals leaves some workers and rms unmatched. Example
3 illustrates that the introduction of signals is benecial for a matching market according
to egalitarian welfare criterion if and only if the decrease in the number of matches is o¤set
by better matches of atypical workers. A similar example can show that the total welfare of
rms changes ambiguously.
Example 3 (Welfare of rms and workers) Let us again consider the game of Example
1. Workerscardinal utilities from being matched to rst, second, and third choice are +; ;
and     correspondingly. The expected total welfare of workers in no signaling match
E[W nosignalsworker ] =
P3
i=1

(1  ")u(i) + "1
3
P3
l=1 u(l)

= 3:
One may check that the expected total welfare of workers in very informative equilibrium is18
E[W signalsworker ] = 3 +
  1
3
 + 19
6


"
Hence, the expected total welfare of workers increases, if and only if the di¤erence in utilities
between adjacent rms is large enough,  > 2
19
.
The theorem below summarizes the results derived above.
Theorem 2 For a su¢ ciently small " :
 the expected number of matches in any informative equilibrium is weakly fewer than in
any no signaling equilibrium;
 the e¤ect of signals on the expected total welfare of rms and the expected total welfare
of workers is ambiguous.
18Terms of the order of "2 and "3 are ignored.
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We have compared above the properties of any informative and no signaling equilibrium.
However, more strict result holds for very informative equilibrium. Under the assumption
that there are at least three workers and there exists a worker w, such that there are at
least three rms that weakly prefer worker w to their no signaling matches, jffj 2 F :
w fj wjgj  3; the expected total number of matches is strictly fewer in very informative
equilibrium than in the corresponding no signaling match. The intuition for this result is
similar to the one for Example 1. If rms respond to signals, some of the realized matches
di¤er from no signaling match. Moreover, if at least three rms respond to some workers
signal the exchange of matches the situation presented in Example 2 is impossible for each
realization of preferences. Therefore, the expected number of matches is smaller than the
maximum one in this case.
Theorem 3 For su¢ ciently small "; if there are at least three workers and for some worker
w, j(w)j  3, the expected number of matches is strictly smaller in the very informative
equilibrium than in the corresponding no signaling equilibrium.
Theorem 2 proves that the expected total welfare of workers changes ambiguously with
the introduction of signals. However, the following proposition shows that signals are harmful
to workers only because they deprive them of matches. Workers receive weakly better o¤ers
conditional on the fact that they receive any o¤er.
Proposition 3 If a worker receives an o¤er in any informative equilibrium, this o¤er is
from a rm weakly better than her no signaling match.
It is easy to see that the above statement is not true for rms, because some rms may
have to make o¤ers to workers worse than their no signaling match if she is atypical.
6 Role of signals in matching markets
Coles et al. (2009) show that the introduction of signals increases the expected number of
matches and the welfare of workers. However, they consider an environment where agents
preferences are block-uniform. Specically, there exists a partition F1; : : : ;FB of the rms
into blocks and
1. For any b < b0, where b; b0 2 f1; : : : ; Bg, each worker prefers every rm in block Fb to
any rm in block Fb0 ;
2. Each workers preferences within block Fb are uniform and uncorrelated, for all b;
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3. Firm preferences over workers are uniform and uncorrelated.
This paper shows that Coles et al. (2009) results rely on the assumption that preferences
are block-uniform. If the preferences of workers are almost aligned and the preferences
of rms are xed and commonly known, the introduction of signals decreases the expected
number of matches. The e¤ect of signals on the expected total welfare of agents is ambiguous.
Overall, Table I presents the e¤ects from the introduction of the signals for the two di¤erent
environments: almost complete (this paper) and block-uniform distribution of preferences.
Preferences No signals Matches E[Wworker] E[Wrm]
Almost complete 0    
Block-uniform 0 + + 
Table I. Almost complete VS Block-uniform distribution preferences.
A natural question is why signals inuence matching markets in di¤erent ways. We argue
that the signals play two di¤erent roles: transmit information and facilitate information
asymmetry. On the one hand, the introduction of signals helps atypical workers to transmit
information about their preferences and locate a better match. On the other hand, signals
transmit information only to some rms, thus facilitating information asymmetry. This
information asymmetry leads to coordination failures that decrease the number of matches.
When there is ex-ante small amount of information about agentspreferences, information
transmission plays a more important role in match formation. This happens when agents
preferences are ex-ante block-uniform, as in Coles et al. (2009). However, when there is
almost complete information about agentspreferences as in the model of this paper the
introduction of signals leads to coordination failures. Table II presents the comparison.
Preferences Transmit information Facilitate information asymmetry
Almost complete Small Large
Block-uniform Large Small
Table II. The roles of signals
Overall, the signals play controversial roles in the match formation process. This could
make them a less powerful tool than it was previously anticipated.
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7 Public signals
One could conjecture that should signals be public, they would always benet match forma-
tion. Public signals introduce no asymmetry of information among rms. Firms have the
same beliefs about the distribution of workerspreferences and the same beliefs about the
strategies other rms use. Therefore, rms should be able to make o¤ers that are more likely
to be accepted. Unfortunately, this intuition is incorrect. This section illustrates that the
expected number of matches in an equilibrium of the o¤er game with public signals could
be smaller than the expected number of matches in the o¤er game without signals.
We consider a market with three rms and three workers. The distribution of agents
preferences is the same as in Section 3. Each worker can send at most one signal and accept
at most one o¤er. Each rm has only one vacant position and can make at most one o¤er.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Agentspreferences are realized. Each worker sends a signal to at most one rm; signals
are sent simultaneously. All agents observe what signals each rm receives.
2. Each rm makes an o¤er to at most one worker; o¤ers are made simultaneously.
3. Each worker chooses an o¤er to accept from the set of o¤ers she receives.
The only di¤erence from the game we considered previously is that all agents observe the
signals each rm receives. The strategies of workers are the same as in Section 3. However,
a strategy of rm f now depends on the set of signals each rm receives, sf : FW !W.19
As previously, the only equilibrium outcome of the o¤er game with signals is a full
match. However, the expected number of matches could be smaller than three if we allow
workers to send public signals. Intuitively, public signals do not transmit enough information
about workerspreferences. This could introduce a considerable amount of uncertainty about
workerspreferences. Therefore, some rms can optimally engage in a competitive behavior
for some workers; i.e. rms make their o¤ers to the same worker in an equilibrium. This
produces mismatches.
Example 4 There are three rms and three workers. Firms have the same ranking over
workers, which we denote as (w1; w2; w3). The typical worker preference list is (f1; f2; f3).
The atypical worker preferences are uniformly distributed. We assume that all rms have the
same cardinal utility and their utility from being matched to second top worker, i.e. u(2); is
at least twice as great as the cardinal utility from being matched to the third top worker, i.e.
u(3).
19Note that we again omit the dependence of strategies on rmspreferences, as we assume that each rm
has xed commonly known preferences.
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We consider the following strategies of agents in the o¤er game with public signals.
Worker wi sends her signal to the best rm among the rms that weakly prefer worker wi to
their no signaling match (wi) = (fj 2 F : wi fj wj):
swi(wi) = maxwi (f 2 (wi)):
Firms use the following strategies.
1. Firm f1 makes an o¤er to worker w1, if it receives a signal from her; otherwise, it
makes an o¤er to worker w2.
2. Firm f2 makes an o¤er to worker w1; if it receives a signal from her. Firm f2 makes
an o¤er to worker w3, if either worker w1 sends a signal to rm f1 and worker w2
sends a signal to rm f3 or worker w1 sends a signal to rm f3 and worker w2 sends
a signal to rm f2. In all other cases, rm f2 makes an o¤er to worker w2.
3. Firm f3 makes an o¤er to the best worker from whom it receives a signal. If it receives
no signals, it makes an o¤er to worker w3:
Each rms beliefs on the equilibrium path are consistent with agentsstrategies and each
rm o¤-equilibrium beliefs coincide with priors.
Let us consider the strategies outlined in Example 4. Mismatches happen when both
worker w1 and worker w2 are atypical. If at least two atypical workers send their signals
to the same rm, only one worker receives an o¤er from it. Since, signals are public, all
other rms infer that the other worker is atypical. This creates a considerable amount of
uncertainty about the worker preferences. Since, this worker could be a good one, rms have
incentives to compete for her.
Another reason for excessive competition among rms is that signals may not transmit
information about workerstop rms. Some workers send their signals to rms that di¤er
from their top ones in an equilibrium, because they want to attract feasible o¤ers. There-
fore, several rms could have incentives to make an o¤er to a given worker. This creates
competition among rms, which again lead to mismatches.
Proposition 4 formally proves that the set of strategies in Example 4 constitutes a se-
quential equilibrium.
Proposition 4 The set of strategies in Example 4 constitutes a sequential equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Figure II. Public signals.
The implications of the above example can be summarized by way of two observations.
First, public signals do not transmit enough information about workerspreferences. This
could introduce uncertainty about workers preferences and induce excessive rm competition
for the same workers. This results in mismatches.
In addition, mismatches in the o¤er game with public signals occur only if there at least
two atypical workers, which happens only with probability of the order "2. In contrast,
mismatches in the o¤er game with private signals occur with the probability of the order ".
Therefore, mismatches happen less often when signals are public.
8 Conclusion
There is a general belief that preference signaling should facilitate match formation (see
Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Roth, 2008; AEA, 2005). This belief is also supported by Coles
et al. (2009) who show that the introduction of signals increases the expected number of
matches and welfare of workers. We show in this paper that this belief can be erroneous for
some matching markets. We exemplify an environment in which the introduction of signals
harms matching markets: it decreases the expected number of matches and ambiguously
a¤ects the welfare of rms and the welfare of workers. Based on this example, we argue that
signals play controversial roles in match formation. Though they help to transmit infor-
mation about participantspreferences, they also facilitate information asymmetry among
them. While the former e¤ect reduces coordination failures and facilitates better match for-
mation, the latter e¤ect acts in the opposite direction. Finally, we show that making signals
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observable to all agents does not change the welfare applications. We leave here as an open
empirical question which e¤ect dominates in real matching markets.
In conclusion, we want to discuss some assumptions of our model. We analyze the
introduction of signals to congested decentralized matching markets, as we believe the job
market for new Ph.D. economists to be. The fact that we do not analyze any centralized
clearinghouse mechanism and stable matches captures the idea of decentralized markets. The
fact that we analyze a one-period model captures the idea of congestion. Moreover, several
(but nite) periods of interactions between rms and workers would give an opportunity for
rms to secure better matches; but signals would still introduce information asymmetry. If
each worker sent several signals, these would transmit information to a greater number of
rms, but each signal would be less informative. Several vacant positions would make only
the preferences of rms more complicated and would not inuence the results. Overall, the
roles of signals in match formation are robust to these modications.
The results of this paper are in terms of a su¢ ciently small ". However, what we re-
ally need is the uniqueness of equilibrium in the benchmark model without signals. The
multiplicity of equilibria does not allow a clean comparison between models with and with-
out signals. One could check that there is a unique equilibrium in no signaling model with
uniform distribution of atypical preferences if " < min(mini(
u(i) u(i+1)
u(i)
); u(F )
u(F )+0:5u(1)
):
We should also highlight that we rely on cardinal utility in our analysis. Our results could
not be extended to an ordinal framework, because an Ordinal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(see dAspremont and Peleg, 1988) may not exist in our environment.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let us show this statement for each rm sequentially. Each worker wi has preferences
0 = (f1; :::; fF ) with probability 1 " and with complementary probability some preferences
distributed according to A(W). Let us consider rm f1 which has some preferences f1 . If it
makes an o¤er to worker w1 = maxf1 (wjw 2 W), its o¤er will be the best worker w1s o¤er
with probability at least 1   ". Hence, its expected utility from making an o¤er to worker
w1 equals at least (1   ")u(1) which is greater than u(2) for su¢ ciently small ". Hence,
independently on other rmsstrategies, rm f1s optimal strategy is to make an o¤er to its
best worker.
Let us assume that each rm fk, k < j; makes its o¤er to worker wk. Now we consider
the decision of rm fj. The expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to some worker among
fw1; :::wj 1g is less than "u(1). In the same time the expected payo¤ from making o¤er to
some worker among Wnfw1; :::wj 1g is at least (1   ")u(j): Hence, given the strategies of
other rms and su¢ ciently small ", the optimal strategy of rm fj is to make an o¤er to its
best worker among Wnfw1; :::wj 1g.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The only undominated strategy of a worker at the last stage is to choose the best o¤er
among available ones. Then, under the condition that rm f does not respond to any signal,
for any h  W reached in an equilibrium sf (h) = const. Let us assume that there exists
a realization of agentspreferences such that rm f1 is matched to some worker wi, i > 1;
in the equilibrium. Hence, for any h  W ; reached in the equilibrium, sf1(h) = wi. Hence,
the expected rm 1s payo¤ equals at most u(2). However, the strategy sf1(h) = w1 for
any h  W is compatible with assumption that rm f1 does not respond to any signals
and gives payo¤ (1  ")u(1) independently of strategies of other rms. Hence, sf1(h) = wi
cannot be an equilibrium strategy. Similar argument could be applied to any other rm fj,
j = 2; :::; F:
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Proof of Theorem 1.
We prove the theorem by way of several lemmata. In the proof of the lemmata we presume
that " is su¢ ciently small. First, we establish that a rm believes about a particular worker
is typical with probability more than 1  " either when it receives her signal or when it does
not receive her signal. Second, we show that rms do not make their o¤ers to a worker better
than no signaling match if they do not receive her signal. The third lemma proves that if a
rm does receive a signal from a worker better than its no signaling match, it makes its o¤er
to the best such worker. Finally, using the statements of lemmata we show that the set of
strategies stated in the theorem constitutes a unique very informative equilibrium.
First two lemmata do not require the assumption that each rm fj, j = 1; :::; F; responds
to all signals from workers better or equal to worker wj according to its preferences.
Lemma A1 For any worker w 2 W, any rm f 2 F , and any h  W either f (w =
0jh [ w)  1   " or f (w = 0jhnw)  1   ". Similarly, either f (w 6= 0jh [ w)  " or
f (w 6= 0jhnw)  ".
Proof.
Let us denote as T and A the probabilities that typical and atypical type of worker
w correspondingly send a signal to rm f . Then, if worker w sends her signal to rm f;
(1  ")T + "A > 0; we derive its beliefs using Bayesrule(
f (w = 0jh [ w) = (1 ")T(1 ")T+"A
f (w = 0jhnw) = (1 ")(1 T )(1 ")(1 T )+"(1 A)
One can verify that (
f (w = 0jh [ w)  1  " , T  A
f (w = 0jhnw)  1  " , T  A
Hence, either f (w = 0jh[w)  1 " or f (w = 0jhnw)  1 ". If worker w never sends
her signal to rm f , (1  ")T + "A = 0; rm fs beliefs are f (w = 0jhnw) = 1  " and
f (w = 0jh [ w) is arbitrary. The second statement directly follows from the rst one. 
Lemma A2 (O¤er to better workers) If rm fj does not receive a signal from worker
w strictly better than worker wj, w fj wj it does not make an o¤er to her in an equilibrium.
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Proof.
We prove this statement for rms sequentially. Let us rst show its validity for j = 2.
The only worker that could be better than worker w2 for rm f2 is worker w1 by construction.
If w2 f2 w1 we are done. Assume that w1 f2 w2:
There are two possibilities: either worker w1(T ) sends her signal to rm f1, i.e. sw1(0) =
f1; or she does not send her signal to rm f1, i.e. sw1(0) 6= f1, in an equilibrium.
Assume worker w1 employs strategy sw1(0) = f1. If rm f2 does not receive worker w1
signal, rm f2 believes she is atypical with probability less than "; f2(w1 6= 0jhnw1)  "
(Lemma A1). According to assumption F  W; rm f2 can secure a match with some worker
wi; i  2; with probability at least 1   ". Hence, rm f2 does not make an o¤er to worker
w1 in an equilibrium.
Worker w1 employs strategy sw1(0) 6= f1 in an equilibrium only if rm f1 makes its o¤er
to worker w1 with probability equals to one, and rm f2 has a chance to be matched with
worker w1 only if she is atypical. Assume rm f2 makes an o¤er to worker w1 when it does
not receive her signal. If w1(T ) sends her signal to rm f2 in an equilibrium, according to
Assumption PRS rm f2 should also make an o¤er if it receives a signal from w1. However,
if it receives a signal from w1, the probability that worker w1 is atypical less than " (Lemma
A1), which contradicts equilibrium behavior.
Now, we assume that worker w1(T ) does not send her signal to rm f2 in an equilibrium.
If rm f2 does not receive worker w1s signal, rm f2 believes that she is atypical with
probability less or equal ", f2(w1 6= 0jhnw1)  " (Lemma A1). Therefore, it is again
suboptimal for rm f2 to make an o¤er to worker w1 if it does not receive a signal from her.
We have shown above that it is suboptimal for rm f2 to make an o¤er to worker w1 if
it does not receive a signal from her. Let us assume that it is suboptimal for any rm fj;
j < k to make its o¤er to a worker wt, t < j; if rm fj does not receive a signal from it and
show that the claim for rm fk:
We consider some worker wi, i < k. Firm fi makes its o¤er to workers fw1; :::; wi 1g with
probability less than " (i  1) : In addition, worker wi is atypical with probability ". Hence,
rm fk can secure a match with worker wi with probability equals at most i" if it does not
receive a signal from her: For small enough " rm fks o¤er to worker wi is suboptimal. 
Now, we assume that each rm fj, j = 1; :::; F; responds to all signals from workers better
or equal to worker wj according to its preferences. The following lemma shows that rm fj
makes its o¤er to some worker w better or equal to worker wj if worker ws signal is the best
signal rm fj receives.
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Lemma A3 (Response to signals) Assume that F > W: Then, for any h  W sfj(h) =
maxfj (w : w 2 h) if h \(fj) 6= ? in very informative equilibrium20:
Proof.
We prove this statement for rms sequentially. Let us consider rm f1 and worker w1.
Assume that worker w1 employs strategy sw1(0) 6= f1. Then, rm f1 believes that for any
h  W f1(w1 = 0jhnw1)  1  ". Therefore, for su¢ ciently small ", rm f1 always makes
its o¤er to worker w1, which contradicts to our assumption that it responds to worker w1s
signal. Therefore, under the assumption that rm f1 responds to a signal from worker w1,
the only possible worker w1s equilibrium strategy is sw1(0) = f1. In this case, for any
h  W rm f1s belief is f1(w1 = 0jh [ w1)  1   ". Hence, rm f1s highest expected
payo¤ when it receives worker w1s signal is from making an o¤er to worker w1. Hence, for
any h  W ; rm f1s strategy sf1(h [ w1) = w1 is optimal.
Assume now that for any t  j < k, and for any h  W, rm fj employs strategy for
sfj(h) = maxfj (w : w 2 h) if h\(fj) 6= ?:We prove below that rm fks optimal strategy
for any h  W and sfk(h) = max(w : w 2 h) if h \(fk) 6= ?:
There are two possibilities: either swk(0) 6= fk or swk(0) = fk: For the former case, for
any h  W fk(wk = 0jhnwk)  1   ": Hence, it is optimal for rm fk to make an o¤er
to worker wk when it receives no signals from workers better or equal to worker wk; i.e. for
any h0  W such that h0 \ (fk) = ?; sfk(h0) = wk. Hence, it is also optimal for rm fk
to make an o¤er to worker wk when worker wks signal is the best signal it receives, i.e. for
any h00  W such that such that h00 \(fk) = wk; sfk(h00) = wk: Therefore, rm fk does not
respond to worker wks signal. Contradiction.
For the latter case, swk(0) = fk, if rm fk does not receive a signal from worker wk, it
anticipates that she is atypical. Therefore, rm fk does not make its o¤er to her. If rm
fj receives signals from any worker wi  wk no other rm fp; p 6= j and p > i; makes its
o¤er to worker wi according to Lemma A2: The only o¤ers that compete with rm fjs o¤er
could be the ones from the set ffp; p < ig: However, any rm fp, p < i; could make an
o¤er to worker wi only if worker wp is atypical, which happens with probability ". Hence,
the interim expected payo¤ for rm fj from making its o¤er to worker wi equals at least
(1   (i   1)")u0; where u0 = ufj(wi; fj). Firm fj expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to
any other worker from set (fj) is smaller than (1  (i  1)")u0 as this worker either has not
sent a signal to rm fj or has a smaller rank in rm fjpreferences. The expected payo¤
from making an o¤er to some worker Wn(fj) is smaller either. Therefore, rm fj optimal
strategy is; sfj(h) = maxfj (w : w 2 h) if h \(fj) 6= ?. 
20If F = W the claim is still valid with the same assumption for all rms except rm fF . Firm fF should
respond to a signal from any worker strictly better than the corresponding one.
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Now we are ready to prove the theorem. Let us show that the set of strategies, stated
in the theorem, constitutes an equilibrium. We rst prove that if all agents, except rm fl;
follow the strategies, stated in the theorem, rm fls strategy is optimal given its belief is
consistent with the other agentsstrategies. If rm fl receives a signal from worker wt; t < l;
rm fl believes that itself is the best rm among (wt) = ffj 2 F : wt fj wjg. Let us
assume that worker wt is the best worker who sends a signal to rm fl. Worker wt does not
accept rm fls o¤er only if she receives an o¤er from some rm fk 2 Wn(wt). However, it
happens only if worker wk is atypical, i.e. with probability less than ". Hence, rm fl interim
expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to worker wt equals at least (1  (n  1) ")u0; where
u0 = ufl(wt; fl). Firm fls o¤er to a worker better than worker wt is not optimal according
to Lemma A1. Firm fls expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to some worker w, wt fl w;
is also smaller than making an o¤er to worker wt for su¢ ciently small ": Overall, rm fls
strategy is optimal.
Let us show that, if all agents, except worker wt; follow the strategies, stated in the
theorem, worker wts strategy is optimal. Firm ft does not make an o¤er to worker wt when
it receives a signal from a better worker. Therefore, if worker wt is typical, her payo¤ from
sending a signal to rm ft equals at least [1  (l   1)"]u(t). If worker wt does not send her
signal to rm ft it loses her o¤er and she could get payo¤ at most u(t   1), which is less
than [1  (l   1)"]u(t) for su¢ ciently small ". There is also no reason for worker wt to send
her signal to a rm better than rm ft; because this rm does not respond to her signal
according to its equilibrium strategies. Hence, worker wt(T )s strategy is optimal. Using
similar logic one can show that worker wt(A)s strategy is also optimal.
Now we show that the above strategies constitute the unique very informative equilibrium.
Lemmata A2 and A3 imply that each rm fl, l = 1; :::; F; has to follow the following strategies
in an equilibrium:
for any h  W ;
(
sfl(h) 6= wl if h \(fl) = ?
sfl(h) = wl if h \(fl) = wl
Straightforwardly, the only worker wl(T )s optimal strategy is to send her signals to rm
fl, swl(0) = fl, otherwise, rm fls does not make an o¤er to student wl:
Let us consider rm f  = maxwl (f
0 2 (wl)). Firm f  responds to signals from workers
better or equal than no signaling match and its equilibrium beliefs are f(wl = 0jhnwl) 
1 " and f(wl 6= 0jh[wl) = 1. Therefore, if rm f  does not receive a signal better than
worker wls one, its optimal strategy is to make an o¤er to worker wl. Taking into account
that rm f  can receive a signal from a better worker with probability less than (l   1)",
worker wl(A)s optimal strategy is to send her signal to rm f  (for su¢ ciently small "):
Hence, the strategies, stated in the theorem, constitute the unique equilibrium. 
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Proof of Theorem 3.
Assumption that A(W) has a full support and that the strategies of the very informative
equilibrium guarantee that some worker wi sends her signals to each rm in the set (wi) =
jffj 2 F : wi fj wjgj with positive probability. Then, using logic of Example 1 and
Example 2 it is straightforward to show that when there are at least three rms in the set
(wi) and there are at least three workers the mismatch happens with positive probability.
Therefore, the expected number of matches strictly smaller than in the corresponding no
signaling equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The statement directly follows from the strategies of the very
informative equilibrium. 
Example A1 (An equilibrium when assumption PRS does not hold) Let us consider
two rms and two workers. We assume that all rms have the same preferences over workers
f1 = f2 = fw1; w2g: Also we assume that each typical worker has preferences 0 = (f1; f2)
and each atypical worker has preferences A = (f2; f1) with probability equal to one. Firms
prefer worker w1 to worker w2. Agents employ the following strategies:
- sw1(0) = f2; sw1(A) = f1
- sw2(0) = f1; sw2(A) = f2
- for any h  W sf1(h) =
(
w1 if w1 =2 h
w2 if w1 2 h
, sf2(h) =
(
w1 if w1 =2 h
w2 if w1 2 h
Agentsbelieves are:
- for any h  W fj(wi : fj = maxwi (f 2 F)jhnwi) = 1 and fj(wi : fj = minwi (f 2
F)jh [ wi) = 1
It is easy to show that the above strategies and the set of beliefs constitute a sequential
equilibrium. One may extend this example for the environment with more rms and workers.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let us rst prove that rmsstrategies are optimal. Note that if rm f receives a signal
from worker w1 it believes that it is her top rm. Therefore, it is optimal for her to make
her an o¤er. Now, if rm f1 that does not receive a signal from worker w1, rm f1 believes
that worker w1 is atypical and will not accept its o¤er. Then, rm f1 strategy of making an
o¤er to worker w2 is optimal for any signaling pattern, because it believes that her o¤er will
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be accepted at least with probability 1
2
. The worst case is when worker w2 is atypical and
sends her signal to rm f3.
Now we consider rm f2 optimal strategy. Let us consider the case when worker w1
sends her signal to rm f1 and worker w2 sends signal to rm f3. Firm f2 believes worker
w2 prefers rm f3 to itself. Since, rm f3 makes an o¤er to worker w2, and rm f1 makes an
o¤er to worker w1; the only worker that could accepts rm f2 o¤er is worker w3. If worker
w1 sends he signal to rm f3 and worker w2 sends her signal to rm f2. In this case rm f1
makes an o¤er to worker w2, who is typical with probability (1  13"). Since, worker w1 most
preferred rm is rm f3; the optimal strategy of rm f2 to make an o¤er to worker w3.
Let us consider the case rm f3 receives signals from all workers. In this case rm f3
makes an o¤er to worker w1. It is optimal for rm f1 and rm f2 to make an o¤er to worker
w2 because her preferences over these rms could be equally likely. Hence, the payo¤ from
making an o¤er to worker w2 equal 12u(2) > u(3). Similar, one could show that in other
cases it is optimal for rm f2 to make an o¤er to worker w2:In a similar way one could show
that it is always optimal for rm f3 to make an o¤er to the best worker it receives a signal
from.
Let us now show each worker uses optimal strategy. Worker w1 strategy is optimal,
because any rm makes her an o¤er upon receiving her signal. There is no incentive for
worker w2 to make an o¤er to rm f1 since, all rms upon observing such behavior has
believes about workers preferences that coincides with the priors. Therefore, worker w2
optimal strategy is to send her signal to the best rms among f1 and f2. Since rms do not
put attention to worker w3 signals, there is no reason for her to deviate from the equilibrium
strategy. 
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